We propose a class of quantum cryptography protocols that are robust against photon-number-splitting attacks ͑PNS͒ in a weak coherent-pulse implementation. We give a quite exhaustive analysis of several eavesdropping attacks on these schemes. The honest parties ͑Alice and Bob͒ use present-day technology, in particular an attenuated laser as an approximation of a single-photon source. The idea of the protocols is to exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states to decrease the information accessible to Eve due to the multiphoton pulses produced by the imperfect source. The distance at which the key distribution becomes insecure due to the PNS attack is significantly increased compared to the existing schemes. We also show that strong-pulse implementations, where a strong pulse is included as a reference, allow for key distribution robust against photonnumber-splitting attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, or more precisely, quantum key distribution ͑QKD͒ followed by the one-time pad, is the only physically secure way of transmitting secret information between the two authorized partners Alice and Bob ͓1-3͔. Its security is not based on some mathematical assumptions, such as a limited eavesdropper's computational power, but on the laws of quantum mechanics. Alice prepares a quantum system in some state, encoding the information, and sends the system to Bob. The eavesdropper Eve cannot gain any knowledge about the quantum state without modifying the correlations between Alice and Bob, because, as it is well known, a measurement on an unknown quantum state normally modifies the state itself. Alternatively, the security of QKD schemes can be discussed in terms of the no-cloning theorem ͓4͔: Eve cannot make and keep a perfect copy of the quantum state that Alice has sent to Bob ͓5͔.
Most of the known QKD protocols use two-dimensional quantum states, called qubits, as information carriers, although there exist alternative proposals using higher dimensional systems, either finite ͓6͔ or infinite ͓7͔. The encoding of information can be performed by means of any twodimensional quantum state, but very often this is done using photons because photons coupled in optical fibers ͑the quantum channel͒ propagate along large distances with almost no decoherence. Therefore, Alice must be able to prepare and send single photons to Bob: The existence of single-photon sources is then an implicit and crucial requirement for many of the proposed implementation of the existing schemes. There is a strong experimental effort in producing reliable single-photon sources, with remarkable achievements ͓8͔. Because of their simplicity however, physicists often use sources that produce weak coherent pulses, ͉␣͘ϭ͉ͱe i ͘, with mean photon number Ӷ1, as an approximation of the single-photon pulse. Moreover, since there is no phase reference outside Alice's lab, the effective state used for the information encoding is ϭ ͵ d 2 ͉ͱe i ͗͘ ͱe i ͉ϭ ͚ n p͑n, ͉͒n͗͘n͉, ͑1͒
i.e., the mixture of coherent states with all possible phases is equivalent to a mixture of Fock states of n photons distributed according to a Poisson statistics of mean , p(n,) ϭe Ϫ n /n! ͓9,10͔. Thus, a large fraction p(0,) of the pulses is empty; Alice produces the desired one-photon Fock state with probability p (1,) ; and, what is more problematic, Alice also produces multiphoton pulses with small but not negligible probability.
The fact that the presence of pulses with more than one photon may deteriorate the security of the protocol is intuitively clear: when a perfect copy of the quantum state is then produced, this copy could be kept by Eve, without introducing any error in the correlations Alice-Bob. Eve can then perform the so-called photon number splitting ͑PNS͒ attack that allows her to get information without being detected. Indeed, Lütkenhaus and Brassard et al. showed ͓10, 11͔ that the presence of these multiphoton pulses makes the best-known QKD protocol, the BB84 scheme ͓1͔, insecure if the losses in the channel become important-that is, for long-distance implementations. This limits the distance up to which BB84 with weak coherent pulses and lossy optical fibers can be securely implemented. For typical experimental parameters this critical distance ᐉ c is of the order of 50 km. As we will show below, similar conclusions are valid for weak pulse implementations of other QKD schemes, such as the B92 ͓12͔ and the 4ϩ2 protocol ͓13͔. The PNS attack is known to be ineffective against some QKD implementations that use entangled states ͑see for instance Ref. ͓3͔͒. However, long-distance QKD with entangled photons is hard to implement. Therefore we focus on prepare-and-measure schemes ͑without entanglement͒.
Recently, quantum cryptography protocols have been proposed that are more robust against PNS attacks ͓14͔. The scope of the present article is to give a detailed security analysis of these protocols under different eavesdropping scenarios. In Sec. II we review the PNS attack for the BB84 scheme, and we show how the same results and conclusions also apply for the B92 and 4ϩ2 protocols. Then, we discuss QKD implementations including a strong reference pulse as a first possibility for minimizing the importance of PNS attacks. The results of this section give the necessary insight to construct the new protocols that are more resistant to PNS attacks. These are presented in Sec. III. We will focus on a particular one, that differs from BB84 only in the classical sifting procedure. We will consider various possible attacks, some which do not introduce errors, some which use cloning machines ͑which do introduce some errors͒, and some which are the combination of both. We briefly discuss the experimental data of Ref. ͓15͔ in the light of our results, as an example of a QKD implementation secure against the considered PNS attacks. In Sec. IV we explore possible generalizations using a larger number of states. The last section summarizes the main results.
Once the contents of the paper are settled, it is also important to stress that the present work is a preliminary investigation-note that the BB84 protocol has been the object of intensive studies during more than a decade. That is why we work under several simplifying assumptions, that allow a simple discussion of the advantages of the new protocols, leaving for further investigation the task of possibly relaxing them. The main assumptions are as follows:
͑i͒ The comparison between the new protocols and the BB84 is made for a constant value of ; specifically, we take ϭ0.1 for BB84, and we adapt for the other protocols in order to have the same raw rate. Ideally, the comparison should be done by choosing the optimal value of at any distance, for each protocol.
͑ii͒ We do not take into account collective attacks, where Eve interacts coherently with more than one pulse. In the type of PNS attacks considered in this work, Eve can measure the number of photons in each pulse, keep some photons in a quantum memory until the basis reconciliation, and replace the lossy line by a lossless line. Moreover, we assume that she measures the kept photons before Alice and Bob start any error correction and privacy amplification process ͓16͔.
͑iii͒ We do not consider advantage distillation protocols for secret-key distillation ͑see, for instance, Ref. ͓17͔͒. Therefore, a protocol is said secure if and only if the information Alice-Bob is greater than Eve's information. Indeed, it was shown in Ref. ͓18͔ that secret-key distillation is possible using one-way privacy amplification whenever
͑iv͒ Moreover, the imperfections of the detectors ͑reduced quantum efficiency d Ͻ1, dark counts...͒ will be taken into account only in Sec. IV. The first comparison of the BB84 protocol with the new one ͑Sec. III͒ will be done for perfect detectors.
II. PNS ATTACK
Any experimental realization using photons of a QKD protocol with two-dimensional quantum states must ideally be performed with a single-photon source. Unfortunately, this is a very strong requirement with present-day technology, and one has to design a way of experimentally approximating the single-photon source. In spite of the fact that QKD has proven to be unconditionally secure ͑see, for instance, Ref. ͓19͔͒, this may not be the case any longer if the technology of the honest parties is not perfect.
In most of the existing implementations, the one-photon pulse is approximated by a weak coherent pulse ͉ͱe i ͘. As said above, since there is no absolute phase reference, the state seen by Bob and Eve is given by Eq. ͑1͒, an incoherent mixture of n-photon states with Poisson probabilities. Eve can then perform a photon number nondemolition measurement, keep one of the photons when a multiphoton state is found, and forward the rest to Bob. Note that Eve's action is not detected by Bob if he is assumed to have only access to the average detection rate, and not to the statistics of the photons he receives. We also assume that Eve is able to control the losses on the line connecting Alice and Bob ͑or equivalently she can send photons to Bob by a lossless line͒. In this situation, Eve can perform the so-called PNS attack that, as we show below, limits the security of many of the known existing protocols.
A. BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol ͓1͔, Alice chooses at random between two mutually unbiased bases, in which she encodes a classical bit. Denoting by ͉Ϯx͘ (͉Ϯy͘) the eigenvectors of x ( y ) with eigenvalue Ϯ1, she can encode a logical 0 into either ͉ϩx͘ or ͉ϩy͘ and a 1 into either ͉Ϫx͘ or ͉Ϫy͘. She sends the qubit to Bob, who measures at random in the x or y basis. Then, they compare the basis and when they coincide, the bit is accepted. In this way, half of the symbols are rejected, and, in the absence of perturbations, Alice and Bob end up with a shared secret key. In practical situations, and due to the presence of errors and possibly a spy, some error correction and privacy amplification techniques have to be applied, in order to extract a shorter completely secure key. Now, let us see how Eve can take advantage of the multiphoton pulses. Alice sends a pulse with Ӷ1 coding the classical bit ͑say on light polarization͒. Eve performs the photon number measurement and when two or more photons are detected, she takes one and forwards the rest to Bob by her lossless line. Eve stores the photon in a quantum memory and waits until the basis reconciliation. Once the basis is announced, she has only to distinguish between two orthogonal states, which can be done deterministically. Thus, for all the multiphoton pulses Eve obtains all the information about the sent bit. If Alice and Bob are in principle connected by a lossy line, Eve can block some of the single-photon pulses, and forward the multiphoton pulses, on which she can obtain the whole information, by her lossless line. In this way, Alice and Bob do not notice any change in the expected raw rate, and Eve remains undetected. When the losses are such that Eve can block all the single-photon pulses, the protocol ceases to be secure.
Denote by ␣ the losses ͓dB/km͔ on the line. The transmission on a line of length ᐉ ͓km͔ is tϭ10 Ϫ␦/10 , ␦ϭ␣ᐉ.
͑3͒
As we said, we keep the discussion simple by considering the case of perfect detectors: anyway, PNS attacks on the BB84 protocol have been thoroughly studied in Refs. ͓10͔ and ͓11͔. If the detectors are perfect, Bob counts a photon whenever he receives at least one, so the raw detection rate per pulse is simply
Eve is placed just outside Alice's lab, and is supposed to apply only the PNS attack. Whenever Alice produces more that one photon, Eve can keep one, since she forwards the rest on a perfect line to Bob, who anyway will detect something. The only constraint that Eve must fulfill to be undetected is that the raw rate must not change; to ensure this, Eve should let a fraction q of the one-photon pulses go to Bob, in such a way that
is equal to R Bob . If the losses t are such that q can be zero in Eq. ͑5͒, that is, when all the one-photon pulses can be blocked, then Eve gets all the information, without being detected: Eve's information, in percent of the length of the key, is
The critical attenuation ␦ c at which Eve knows all the key using the PNS attacks is then given by the condition R BB84 ϭR Bob . In Fig. 1 
where p(n,2) are Poisson probabilities of mean photon number 2 and
Note that Bob's state is given by an expression like Eq. ͑7͒ multiplying the mean photon number by the channel attenuation. It is possible to define a creation and annihilation operator
such that acting on the two-mode vacuum state gives a † ()͉0,0͘ϭ͉ 1 ()͘. It is straightforward to see that
͓a † ,a͔ϭ1 and ͗ n Ј ()͉ n ()͘ϭ␦ n,n Ј . Thus, the situation is the same as in the previous polarization encoding scheme ͓10͔. Eve can count the total number of photons in the two ͑now temporal͒ modes, in an analogous way as in the previous photon number measurement for polarization, without being noticed by Bob. When ''more than one'' photons are detected, i.e., she projects into ͉ 2 ͘, she stores one copy of the state in her quantum memory until the basis reconciliation. Obviously, the equations and critical values in this case are the same as the ones found above for the polarization encoding scheme.
B. B92 protocol
An alternative QKD scheme is given by the B92 protocol ͓12͔. The classical bit is simply encoded by Alice using two nonorthogonal states, ͉ 0 ͘ and ͉ 1 ͘ with ͗ 0 ͉ 1 ͘ 0. Without losing generality we take ͓22͔
with 0рр/2 and the overlap is ͉͗ 0 ͉ 1 ͉͘ϭcos .
Bob has to distinguish between two nonorthogonal quantum states, and this can only be done with some probability. The measurement optimizing this probability is defined by the following positive operators, summing up to one ͓23͔: for the BB84 this probability is equal to one half. Eve's PNS attack is described in the following lines. In a weak pulse encoding scheme, this protocol is clearly insecure. What Eve can simply do is to perform the same unambiguous measurement as Bob. When a conclusive result is found, she knows the state and she prepares a copy of it on Bob's side. When Eve is not able to determine the state, she blocks the pulse. Of course, as soon as we have some losses in the channel Alice and Bob cannot detect the eavesdropping ͑since they assume that the absence of signal is due to the losses͒, and the protocol is insecure. Note that in this case Eve does not need any quantum memory and lossless line.
C. 4¿2 protocol
A third QKD protocol was proposed in Ref. ͓13͔ combining some of the ideas of the B92 and BB84 schemes. As in the BB84 protocol, there are four states grouped into two sets ͕͉0 a ͘,͉1 a ͖͘, ͕͉0 b ͘,͉1 b ͖͘. However, as in the B92, the states in each set are not orthogonal, their overlaps being Fig.   2 , the four states lie on the same parallel of the Bloch sphere. Thus, Alice chooses randomly in which of the two sets the bit is encoded. Bob performs at random one of the two ͑POVMs͒ distinguishing the two states of each set. After basis reconciliation, they determine all the cases where Bob has applied the correct measurement obtaining a conclusive result. At first sight, this protocol seems more resistant against PNS attacks: compared to the BB84 case, Eve can keep some of the photons but her measurement after the basis reconciliation may not be conclusive. Compared to the B92 case, she does not know which of the two measurements has to be applied. However, and due to the particular geometry of the sets of states, this scheme does not offer any advantage over the two previous ones. But before describing Eve's attack, let us show how the three-outcome POVM described by Eq. ͑12͒ can be interpreted as the concatenation of two two-outcome measurements.
The effect of any quantum measurement can be represented by a set of operators
If the initial state is , the probability for any outcome, say i, is
and the state is transformed into
Consider the states ͑11͒. The POVM described by the operators ͑12͒ can be effectively replaced by a sequence of two two-outcome measurements. First, one applies a measurement described by the operators The effect of this first measurement is the following: With probability p ok ϭ1Ϫcos the state ͉ 0 ͘ (͉ 1 ͘) is mapped into ͉ϩx͘ (͉Ϫx͘). This operation is often called a filtering, and it is equivalent to the cases where the POVM ͑12͒ gives a conclusive result. When the outcome ok has been obtained, it is said that the states have passed the filter. If this is the case, a standard von Neumann measurement on the x basis suffices for discriminating between the two states. Let us come back to the 4ϩ2 protocol and consider the filter for the states in set a, sending these states into the x basis. It is not difficult to see that the same filter maps the states in set b into ͉Ϯy͘. Therefore, a BB84-like situation is recovered.
It is now easy to design a PNS attack. First, Eve counts the number of photons. Similar to the B92 case, she applies the filtering two-outcome measurement when a multiphoton pulse is obtained. When the result is conclusive, she keeps the resulting photon in a quantum memory and forwards the rest of the photons to Bob. Then, as in the BB84 case, she waits for the basis reconciliation, and performs the right von Neumann measurement allowing her to read the bit. In order to make a fair comparison, we always impose the same key rate in the absence of Eve as in BB84 using BB84 ϭ0.1. In this case we must have 4ϩ2 ϭ BB84 /͑1Ϫcos ͒.
͑16͒
In a similar way as above for the BB84 case, one can compute Eve's information for this attack. It almost coincides with the curve found for the BB84 protocol, and the critical distance is again ᐉ c ϭ52 km ͑see Fig. 1͒ . Indeed, the critical distance turns out to be quite independent of the degree of nonorthogonality between the states in the 4ϩ2 protocol, if one imposes the equality of the raw rates ͑16͒.
The analysis of the 4ϩ2 protocol ends the present section. All the studied QKD schemes do not guarantee a secure key distillation when the channel attenuation is around 15 dB. Unfortunately, the use of nonorthogonal states has not been enough for avoiding Eve's attacks. The critical distance basically corresponds to the point where the raw rate on Bob's side can be simulated by the number of multiphoton pulses leaving Alice's lab.
D. Strong pulse implementations
The three protocols analyzed in the previous sections are not robust against PNS attacks in a weak coherent pulse implementation. Eve exploits the presence of multiphoton pulses and the losses on the line. At the critical distance, the losses allow her to block all the pulses for which her attack has not succeeded, without being noticed. A possible way of avoiding this problem is to send also a strong reference pulse that must always be detected on Bob's side, as in the original B92 proposal ͓12͔. In this way, Eve cannot block the pulses without introducing errors. This modification is rather easy to handle also at the level of the hardware: one just needs to add and monitor a new detector that checks the presence of the strong pulse. In the following lines we consider these implementations from the point of view of PNS attacks.
The information encoding uses the relative phase between a weak coherent pulse with respect to a strong reference pulse that is sent later through the line. Thus, Alice prepares a weak coherent pulse and a strong pulse, ͉͘ ϭ͉ͱЈe i ͉͘ ͱe i e i ͘, where Јӷ and ϭ0, encodes the classical bit. This is obviously a realization of a B92 scheme, since ͉͗0͉͉͘ϭe Ϫ2 0; the analogous scheme using two sets of states, ϭ0, for one of the sets and ϭ Ϯ/2 for the other, is an implementation of the 4ϩ2 scheme. Let us focus on the B92 ͑as we will see, the same conclusions are valid for the other schemes͒. Denote by r the ratio between the two intensities rϭ/ЈӶ1. Bob delays the weak pulse and makes it interfere with a fraction r of the strong pulse. Constructive and destructive interference correspond to the values 0 and . The probability of inconclusive results is p ? ϭe Ϫ2 as expected ͑see Ref.
͓24͔ for a practical implementation of this measurement͒, and the transmission rate for small is ϳ2 ͓13͔. The detection of the 1ϪrՇ1 fraction of the strong reference pulse by Bob should allow him to detect Eve's intervention, i.e., none of the pulses can be blocked. In particular, Eve cannot limit herself to forward photons only when she has obtained a conclusive result for the unambiguous measurement. Note that this forces the strong-pulse mean photon number to be significant at Bob's side.
Of course, Eve can always take advantage of the multiphoton pulses for acquiring partial information, even if not full information. Here is the analysis of the PNS attack in the present implementation. Since as usual there is no global phase reference available, the effective state leaving Alice's lab is
where p(n,ϩЈ) are Poisson probabilities and
In a similar way as above, one can define
such that acting on the two-mode vacuum state gives a † ()͉0,0͘ϭ͉ 1 ()͘. Again, we have
͓a † ,a͔ϭ1 and ͗ n Ј ()͉ n ()͘ϭ␦ n,n Ј . Eve can perform a nondemolition measurement for these number states without being detected by Bob. Indeed, his state is the same as in Eq. ͑17͒, just taking into account the channel attenuation.
Denote the channel losses by ␦. Since Јӷ, Eve's Poisson distribution is centered around Ј while Bob's around ЈtϭЈ10 Ϫ␦/10 . Moreover the strong pulse must be always detected by Bob, so we will impose Ј10 Ϫ␦/10 ϭ10 ͑at least͒, which means that Јϭ10 (1ϩ␦/10) . In order to make a fair comparison with the BB84 scheme using ϭ0.1, we take the same raw rate in the absence of Eve at the critical distance, which leads to BB84 2 ϭ2 B92 ͑21͒
and then B92 ϭ0.025, i.e., ͉͗0͉͉͘ϭ0.95, and r ϭ10 Ϫ(2ϩ␦/10) /4. Now, Eve performs the measurement in the ͉ n ͘ basis.
Since her Poisson probability is centered around Ј, she obtains a pulse containing ͑on average͒ Ј photons. On Bob's side a pulse with ten photons is expected, so Eve keeps ͉ Ј Ϫ10 ͘ and forwards ͉ 10 ͘ to Bob by her lossless line. Eve's intervention remains unnoticed to Bob. Eve is now faced with the problem of detecting two states having an overlap
͑22͒
She applies the measurement maximizing her information ͓25͔, obtaining
where I(p)ϭ1ϩlog 2 pϩ(1Ϫp)log 2 (1Ϫp) is the binary mutual information ͑in bits͒ and p e is the error probability,
It is not hard to compute the limit for Eve's information. For very large distances, Ј→ϱ and then
i.e., the initial overlap gives the searched limit and I Eve ϳ0.07 bits. Thus, for any distance, the protocol is clearly secure against PNS attacks. The same is valid for the strong pulse realization of the BB84 protocol, which, as said, is the 4ϩ2 scheme. Note that strong pulse implementations appear as an intermediate step in the transition from discrete to continuous variables QKD schemes using coherent states ͓7͔. There, a strong reference pulse, with a very large mean photonnumber Ј, is sent through the channel with a weaker pulse, containing about hundred photons. The security comes from the fact that although is not weak, an infinite range of values is used for the information encoding ͑while, for example, we have only two in the B92 case͒ and Eve is not able to discriminate which state has been sent. Nevertheless, many of the results presented in this section can be translated to these protocols, opening the possibility of new eavesdropping attacks.
An important point about strong pulse QKD implementations was somehow hidden in the previous discussion. As said, one must ensure a reasonable photon number for the strong pulse on Bob's side, i.e., the condition Ј10 Ϫ␦/10 -10 must be always satisfied. Therefore, Ј should be increased with the distance Alice-Bob, while is fixed by the desired overlap between the two states used in the B92 scheme, independently of the distance. In the previous lines we took a quite conservative value, coming from Eq. ͑21͒. We can indeed consider ϭ1/4, which gives ͉͗0͉͉͘ϭ0.6 and I Eve ϳ0.5. This forces Ј and the ratio r to increase with the distance, which can lead to problems in the interferometric arrangement needed for detection. For instance for a distance of 80 km, that taking as usual ␣ϭ0.25 means 20 dB, we have Јϭ10 3 and rϭ10 Ϫ4 /4. However if these requirements are met, a secure implementation becomes possible with a key generation rate significantly larger than for the BB84 scheme using ϭ0.1.
For the rest of the paper however, we will not consider this type of scenario and we will only deal with implementations using weak coherent pulses.
III. QKD PROTOCOLS RESISTANT TO PNS ATTACKS
The aim of the present section is to give QKD protocols resistant to the PNS attack in a weak pulse implementation. From the previous discussion we can understand some of the basic requirement for these schemes. We have seen above that the 4ϩ2 protocol was as vulnerable as B92 against PNS attacks because, in spite of using two sets of states instead of one, a single quantum operation ͑15͒ allows Eve to make pairwise orthogonal the states in the sets a and b. After successfully performing this operation, she can wait for the basis reconciliation, as in the BB84 case, and read the information by a von Neumann measurement. Alice can encode her information into pairs of nonorthogonal states belonging to different sets; but, to increase the robustness against PNS attacks, she must also choose these sets carefully: No quantum operation should exist that increases, even probabilistically, the overlap of the states in all sets at the same time.
A simple choice of such sets is as follows: One takes the two sets of the 4ϩ2 scheme and reflects one of them with respect to the xy plane ͑see Fig. 2͒ . Other solutions are available that are simpler to visualize: Actually, one can restrict oneself to any plane in the Bloch sphere, as in the BB84 case. This situation is depicted in Fig. 3 . The general expression for these states is 
͑26͒
After successful application of the filter that makes the states in set a orthogonal, the overlap between the states in set b has significantly increased. Indeed, it can be shown that no quantum operation can decrease the overlap of the states in both sets a and b ͑see Appendix A͒. So, now Eve has to consider two different filters F a and F b that make the states in set a and set b orthogonal, respectively. If she wants to get the whole information about the bit sent by Alice, she has to block all the pulses with less than three photons. When the pulse contains three photons, she applies F a to the first one, F b to the second one, and only when both of them are conclusive, she forwards the third photon to Bob. It is clear that the distance of Alice-Bob, such that Eve can perform this attack without being detected, is much larger than above. It basically corresponds to the point where the raw rate is equal to the number of pulses on Alice's side with more than two photons. Using this idea, we can design different state configurations. One of them turns out to be equivalent, at the quantum level, to the BB84 scheme. The states and the measurements are the same as in this protocol, the only difference being in the reconciliation process. But, surprisingly, this variation makes the protocol significantly more resistant to PNS attacks. The remaining of this section will be devoted to the detailed security analysis of this protocol, that was first proposed in Ref. ͓14͔.
A. Four-state protocol
The configuration of states in Fig. 3 allows Alice and Bob to exchange a key in a secure way for larger distance than for many of the existing protocols. In the case in which the angle between the states in each set is /2 we recover a BB84-like state configuration. Nevertheless, note that Alice's bit encoding has radically changed ͑see Fig. 3͒ , since orthogonal states encode the same classical bit.
Like we did for BB84, we suppose that Alice uses as information carriers the eigenvectors of x and y . Now, the bit 0 is encoded into ͉Ϯx͘ and 1 into ͉Ϯy͘. Consider the case in which Alice's bit is equal to zero. She chooses randomly between ͉Ϯx͘ and sends the state, say ͉ϩx͘, to Bob. Bob measures randomly in the x or y basis. After this, Alice starts the reconciliation process announcing the sent state and one of the two possible states encoding one, for instance ͕͉ϩx͘,͉ϩy͖͘. If Bob's measurement was in the x basis, the result was ϩ1 ͑remember that the sent state was ͉ϩx͘). This result would also have been possible if Alice had sent the other state she declared, here ͉ϩy͘, so Bob cannot discriminate between the two alternatives. If Bob measured in the y basis, for half of the cases the result was ϩ1 and for the rest Ϫ1. In the first case, again he cannot discriminate; but in the latter, he knows for sure that the sent bit was not ͉ϩy͘, so it must have been ͉ϩx͘: Bob accepts the bit 0. At first sight this is just a trivial and artificially complicated modification of the BB84 protocol. However with these variations the obtained protocol is much more resistant to Eve's attacks.
Eve is faced with the following problem: After Alice's announcement she will have to deal with one of four possible sets of two states:
Eve can determine the sent state unambiguously, with some probability, when the pulse contains at least three photons. Indeed she measures in the x and y basis the two first photons, which allows her to discard two of the four possibilities. Then, she applies to the third photon the measurement discriminating between the two remaining states. This intuitively shows that this scheme is more robust against PNS attacks, since only three-photon pulses provide her with the full information. In the next lines we will extend these ideas in a more precise way, showing that the distance for a secure implementation of this protocol is approximately twice the one for the standard BB84, once the value of is fixed according to the rule we follow in this paper ͓see remark ͑i͒ at the end of Sec. I͔.
A new protocol requires the analysis of a full set of attacks by Eve, some of which may be new ones. In Sec. III B, we deal with attacks exploiting the presence of multiphoton pulses without introducing errors on Bob's side. These are the typical PNS attacks, that motivated the discovery of this protocol. In Sec. III C, we change completely our standpoint: We suppose that we have single-photon sources, and we study individual attacks based on cloning machines. Surprisingly, it turns out that the new protocol is better than the BB84 also on this ground, although the improvement is very small. Finally, in Sec. III D we combine PNS and cloning attacks in a kind of eavesdropping strategy that has never been considered before.
B. PNS attacks
The first type of attacks we consider are of the same type as the PNS attack for the BB84. Eve does not introduce any error on Bob's side, she just uses the multiphoton pulses for acquiring information. Let us first calculate the critical distance at which Eve can obtain full information using the multiphoton pulses. We have just given a simple strategy for Eve to determine unambiguously the state sent by Alice, that works with some probability and provided that the pulse contains at least three photons. This is indeed a general result: Unambiguous discrimination between N states of a two-dimensional Hilbert space is only possible when at least NϪ1 copies of the state are available ͓26͔. In this case, the N states ͉ i ͘ (NϪ1) belong to the symmetric subspace of (C 2 ) (NϪ1) of dimension N. Since the N states are always linearly independent ͑see Appendix B͒, unambiguous discrimination is possible. Above we have described a sequence of measurements allowing unambiguous discrimination between three copies of the four states ͉Ϯx͘,͉Ϯy͘. The probability of success is given by the third measurement that discriminates between two quantum states having an overlap of 1/&, i.e., p ok ϭ1 Ϫ1/&ϳ0.3. However, better strategies should be expected if one acts globally on the three copies of the unknown state. For instance, one can use the natural generalization of the POVM described by Eqs. ͑12͒. For any iϭϮx,Ϯy one can define ͉ i Ќ ͘(C 2 ) sym 3 as the state orthogonal to the three vectors ͉ j ͘ 3 , with j i. Then, the searched measurement is given by the five positive operators summing up to the identity of (C 2 ) sym 3 , denoted by 1 3,sym ,
The probability of having an inconclusive result is, where ͉i
Indeed, this measurement is optimal if we impose that the probability of conclusive result has to be the same for the four possibilities to be distinguished. In fact, from Chefles' work ͓27͔, we know that the maximal probability of unambiguous discrimination is equal to the reciprocal of the maximum eigenvalue of the operator
which gives p ok (3)ϭ1/2 ͓28͔. Actually, Chefles' optimal discrimination method can be applied also to the case when the pulse contains nϾ3 photons. The optimal probability for discriminating between the four states under study knowing that n copies are available has been found numerically to be p ok (n)ϭ1Ϫ(1/2) ͓(nϪ1)/2͔ , where ͓•͔ is the rounding to the closest lower integer.
The critical distance is given by the point at which Eve can block all the pulses containing less than three photons and those pulses with more than three photons for which the unambiguous discrimination has failed, that is, when Bob's raw rate reaches
Eve's information is shown in Fig. 4 , and the critical distance turns out to be of approximately 100 km ͓29͔. Note that we take ϭ0.2, in order to make a fair comparison with BB84 using ϭ0.1. As for BB84 and for the same reason, the result also holds in very good approximation for finite detector efficiency d , provided that Eve cannot increase this efficiency. We have just described an intercept-resend strategy that works well at large distances. For small distances however, this strategy is quite inefficient from Eve's point of view. Indeed, for those instances it is better for her to apply a different PNS attack, that we call storing attack: all singlephoton pulses are blocked, while for all the multiphoton pulses, she keeps one photon in a quantum memory until the set reconciliation. Then, she has to distinguish between two nonorthogonal quantum states, say ͉ϩx͘ and ͉ϩy͘. She will apply the measurement maximizing her information obtaining ͓see Eq. ͑23͔͒ I Eve ϳ0.4 and where the error probability is p e ϭ 1 2 ͑ 1Ϫͱ1Ϫ͉͗ϩx͉ϩy͉͘ 2 ͒ϳ0.14. ͑32͒
Storing attacks are particularly dangerous as soon as there are errors in the transmission. If this is the case, the information Alice-Bob, I AB , is smaller than one and indeed, it may be smaller than Eve's information ͑see Sec. IV for a more careful analysis͒. In a similar way to that described above, FIG . 4. The figure shows different eavesdropping attacks that take advantage of the presence of multiphoton pulses for the fourstate protocol. The dashed line represents the attack where all pulses with less than three photons are blocked. Eve can however interpolate between different attacks as described in the text, depending on the channel losses. The solid line is Eve's information for this second possibility.
depending on the channel losses, Eve can interpolate between the storage and the intercept-resend attacks. The corresponding information curves are shown in Fig. 4 .
The presence of multiphoton pulses represents a serious drawback, since Eve can take advantage of them for acquiring information on the sent bit. Since we do not consider advantage distillation protocols, the honest parties can extract a key when Eq. ͑2͒ is satisfied. This means that the secret bit rate generation, after error correction and privacy amplification, is
where R Bob is the raw rate of Eq. ͑4͒. The 1/4 term takes into account the set reconciliation process ͑Bob has to choose the right measurement and obtain the right outcome͒, and the last term comes from the privacy amplification protocol. Note that we assume for simplicity no errors between Alice and Bob, I AB ϭ1. There is in principle an obvious way of avoiding the influence of multiphoton pulses: to decrease the pulse mean photon number. Nevertheless, this solution may be very inefficient, since the raw rate R Bob is approximately proportional to . Therefore, there is a compromise from the point of view of key generation. Using the same techniques as for Fig. 4 , for any ␦ one can compute the optimal maximizing R key . The corresponding curve is shown in Fig. 5 . Note that mean photon numbers ϳ0.2 are indeed optimal for losses ϳ20 dB.
C. Individual attacks using cloning machines
All the eavesdropping strategies studied up to now take advantage of the fact that the technological power for the honest parties has some limitations. In particular, Eve uses the multiphoton pulses for acquiring information on the sent bit without introducing any error. Nevertheless, the present protocol must also be analyzed under the presence of errors, even at the single-photon level. It may happen that a small amount of error would allow Eve to gain a large amount of information making the protocol unpractical. Indeed, these are the attacks Eve would apply at very short distances, where she cannot block almost any pulse and almost all the nonempty pulses reaching Bob contain just one photon.
The optimal individual eavesdropping strategy for this protocol is unknown. Nevertheless, note that the quantum structure is the same as for the BB84 scheme, so it seems natural to consider its robustness against attacks using asymmetric phase covariant cloning machines ͓30,31͔. These machines, that are briefly described in Appendix C, clone in an optimal way all the states in a plane of the Bloch sphere. Let us stress here that they provide the optimal eavesdropping for the BB84 protocol ͓32͔. The action of these machines in the protocol is depicted in Fig. 6 .
Key distillation using privacy amplification is possible whenever Eq. ͑2͒ is fulfilled. This means that the honest parties can tolerate an error up to ϳ15%, slightly larger than the 14.67% for the BB84. There are two facts in these curves that deserve explanation. First, note that the Cerf cloning machine ͓30͔ is clearly more efficient from Eve's point of view than the Niu-Griffiths one ͓31͔. Second, note the surprising decreasing behavior of Eve's information for large values of the quantum bit error rate ͑QBER͒. Both of them are related to the quantum correlations introduced by each of the cloning machines between Eve and Bob, and the sifting procedure used in the described protocol.
Eve waits until the sifting process before doing her measurement. If, for instance, Alice announces ͉ϩx͘, ͉ϩy͘ and Bob accepts the symbol, Eve knows that Bob has successfully projected onto either ͉Ϫx͘ or ͉Ϫy͘. Then, she modifies her quantum state according to this information. The fact that FIG. 5 . The figure shows the mean photon number maximizing the key rate generation Eq. ͑33͒ as a function of the distance. For small distances one cannot take arbitrarily large, since the four states would become almost orthogonal and Eve could do an intercept-resend attack without being detected. For large distances, cannot be arbitrarily small, since the signal becomes negligible with respect to dark counts and the channel is completely noisy, I AB ϳ0. Bob has got a conclusive result ͑he could discriminate between the two nonorthogonal states͒ increases also the distinguishability on Eve's side because of the quantum correlations. On the one hand, this justifies why the Cerf cloning machine is more efficient for eavesdropping. It establishes stronger correlations between Eve and Bob, and this helps Eve after the sifting process. On the other hand, this also explains the decreasing behavior of Eve's information curves large QBER. For very large disturbances, the correlations between Eve and Bob decreased, and knowing that Bob has obtained a conclusive result does not help her too much. Thus, it is better to keep some quantum correlations with Bob, in such a way that his successful unambiguous discrimination increases the distinguishability on Eve's side too. In the limiting case of maximum error, Eve just takes the state sent by Alice and prepares at random one of the four possible states for Bob ͑or in equivalent terms, she forwards a completely noisy state͒. Her information is simply given by Eq. ͑23͒ as expected.
D. PNS¿cloning attacks
The eavesdropping strategies analyzed up to now take advantage, either of the presence of multiphoton pulses ͑PNS attacks͒ or of the errors on Bob's side ͑cloning attacks͒. However for losses such that Eve can simulate the expected rate even if she blocks all the single-photon pulses, she can combine the two type of attacks, if she is allowed to introduce some errors. This basically corresponds to distances ᐉ տ40 km ͑see Fig. 4͒ . There, Eve counts the number of photons in the pulse and stops those having one photon. For all the two-photon pulses, she applies an asymmetric phase covariant 2→3 cloning machine, and forwards one of the clones to Bob. This operation introduces errors, depending on the quality of Bob's clone. In general, for a pulse having n photons, she uses an n→nϩ1 cloning machine, although in this section we consider only the 2→3 case, since p 2 is significantly larger than p 3 . As far as we know this type of attack has been never considered before, nor have the corresponding phase covariant n→m asymmetric cloning machines. In Appendix D we describe two unitary transformations generalizing, in a nonoptimal way, the asymmetric 1 →2 cloning machines to the 2→3 case ͓33͔.
The attack goes as follows. Eve counts the number of photons in the pulse. All the single-photon pulses are blocked, while for those pulses having two photons she applies one of the 2→3 cloning machines shown in Appendix D. In this case it is unclear which of the clone states she has to forward to Bob. It turns out that for small disturbances, such that Eve's information is smaller than I AB , there is almost no difference between the two cases. Figure 7 shows the information Eve can get with this strategy as a function of the disturbance on Bob's side. We consider that Bob receives one of the two clones with the same fidelity, i.e., either the first or the second qubit of Eqs. ͑D3͒ or ͑D5͒. Key distillation is possible using error correction and one-way privacy amplification up to disturbances of approximately 8.5%.
E. Geneva-Lausanne experiment
The four-state protocol is at the level of state preparations and measurements, identical to the BB84 scheme. It only differs in the sifting process, less efficient in the absence of Eve by a factor of two on the raw key, but more robust against PNS attacks. Thus, all the existing experimental implementations of the BB84 protocol can be thought of as implementations of the new four-state protocol.
Let us analyze the recent Geneva-Lausanne experiment ͓15͔, where a key was distributed over 67 km using the BB84 scheme. The mean photon number of the pulses used in this experiment was indeed 0.2 photons/pulse, so all our results directly apply. According to Fig. 1 , the protocol is not secure at this distance because of the PNS attack, even for ϭ0.1 ͑and BB84 encoding͒. However this is not the case if one uses the new protocol. The experimental QBER was approximately 5%, where 4% was due to dark counts on the detector and 1% due to optical imperfections. As said above, Eve is assumed to have only access to the optical error. Then I AB ϭI(0.05)ϳ0.71 bits, while I Eve ͑see Fig. 7͒ is clearly smaller than 0.5. Thus, Alice and Bob can safely distill a key. Note that even in the more restrictive scenario where Eve can take advantage of the full error ͑including the detector noise͒, her information is smaller than I AB and the protocol is secure. Therefore, this implementation becomes secure against the PNS attacks considered in this work just by changing the sifting process.
IV. GENERALIZATION TO MORE SETS
The detailed analysis of the four-state protocol has given us insight into the way of designing QKD protocols resistant to PNS attacks. The presence of multiphoton pulses is still a problem, since they open the possibility of unambiguous discrimination or storing attacks providing Eve with full or partial information. But there is a simple way of improving the robustness of the protocol: just adding more states for the FIG. 7 . The figure shows Alice's and Bob's versus Eve's information for attacks using the cloning machines described in Appendix D. Upper curves correspond to the cloning machine of Eq. ͑D3͒, which is more powerful from Eve's point of view.
encoding. A quite natural generalization of the previous protocol follows this idea and consists of adding more bases in a plane of the Bloch sphere for the encoding of the bit, as shown in Fig. 8 for the case of four bases ͑eight states͒. On the one hand more photons ͑or copies of the unknown state͒ are needed for the unambiguous discrimination to be possible. On the other hand the overlap between the two announced states decreases, which is also good against storing attacks. Nevertheless, the key rate decreases unless we use a larger mean photon number, which increases the presence of multiphoton pulses, that are dangerous for the security. Thus, a compromise appears. The aim of this section is to explore this fact by analyzing the resistance of this generalized protocols against the two type of attacks mentioned above: PNS with unambiguous discrimination and storing attacks.
Any protocol is uniquely defined by the number of bases n b used for the bit encoding. We will not consider a very large number of bases, since the protocol would become impractical. In the previous sections we had n b ϭ2, while Fig. 8 depicts the case n b ϭ4. If Alice wants to send a bit x, she chooses at random between the n b states encoding x and sends it to Bob. Bob measures at random in any of the n b bases. Then, Alice announces the sent state plus, again randomly, one of the two neighboring states ͑encoding 1Ϫx). Bob accepts the bit when ͑i͒ he has measured in one of the two bases associated to the two states announced by Alice and ͑ii͒ his measurement outcome is orthogonal to one of these states. Indeed, this allows him to discard one of the two possibilities and to infer x. Thus, Bob needs to choose the right measurement and obtain the right outcome, which happens with probability
͑34͒
As usual, in order to make a fair comparison, we impose for any protocol that at very large distances ͑attenuations͒ the raw rate is the same as in the standard BB84 with ϭ0.1. This implies that
Note that for large n b , (n b )ϳn b 3 . This means that the mean photon number becomes significant when n b increases and we are not longer dealing with weak pulses.
Eve has now to discriminate between 2n b one-qubit states, and this can be done with certainty only when n e ϭ2n b Ϫ1 copies of the unknown state are available ͑see Ref.
͓26͔ and Appendix B͒. The maximum probability of success, p ok , correspond to the maximum eigenvalue of the operator ͓27͔
Here ͉k Ќ ͘ denotes the state in (C 2 ) sym n e orthogonal to all ͉ j͘ n e , where jϭ0,...,n e but j k and
͑37͒
We have numerically calculated these probabilities up to n b ϭ8 and they appear to be given by the formula p ok (n b ) ϭn b /4 n b Ϫ1 , although we do not have an analytical proof.
The critical attenuation ␦ 1 ͑in decibels͒ where the protocol ceases to be secure against this attack has to be such that Eve can simulate the expected rate by the number of pulses containing at least n e photons and giving a conclusive result. This leads to
͑38͒
The corresponding curve is shown in Fig. 9 . There are other attacks, exploiting the presence of multiphoton pulses, that provide Eve with partial information without introducing errors. For instance, Eve can count the number of photons and keep n s of them, depending on the channel attenuation, without being detected. She waits until the basis reconciliation and performs the measurement maximizing her information ͓see Eq. ͑23͔͒. These attacks can be very dangerous as soon as we consider errors on the transmission. We assume that the main sources of errors are the detector noise, quantified by the probability p d of having a dark count, and the optical error E opt . The total error E for a channel attenuation of ␦ is approximately equal to
since half of the dark counts produce a click in the wrong detector. Thus, for any distance one can compute the amount 
For intermediate attenuations ͑distances͒, Eve can interpolate between two attacks, as described above. In this way, we can compute the two curves I AB and I Eve as a function of the distance. Figure 10 shows the obtained results, where we took det ϭ0.1, p d ϭ10 Ϫ5 , and E opt ϭ1%. The point where I AB ϭI Eve provides the critical distance ␦ 2 for this type of attacks. In Fig. 9 we plot both the ␦ 1 and ␦ 2 as a function of n b . It is quite plausible that min(␦ 1 ,␦ 2 ) gives a good estimation for ␦ c , the critical distance associated to the unknown optimal attack. Thus, one can safely conclude that a key can be established using a reasonable number of bases up to distances of the order of 150 km ͓29,35͔.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Unconditional security of quantum cryptography relies on some experimental assumptions that are not practical with present-day technology. Thus, in a more realistic scenario, the honest parties have to deal with approximated singlephoton sources, noisy channels, inefficient detectors, and so on, while no limitation on the eavesdropper technology should be assumed. This opens the possibility for alternative eavesdropping attacks, taking advantage of Alice and Bob's technological imperfections. Indeed, using as a reference the BB84 scheme with ϭ0.1, all the known protocols become insecure against PNS attacks for channel losses of the order of 13 dB.
In this paper, we show how to construct QKD protocols resistant against a class of PNS attacks up to channel losses of 40 dB. There are two possibilities for that: ͑i͒ to exploit the nonorthogonality of quantum states in a different way, as in the presented four-state protocol or ͑ii͒ to include a strong reference pulse that must be always detected by Bob. Both possibilities seem achievable with current technology. In the first case, already existent implementations of the BB84 protocol ͓15͔ provide an experimental demonstration of QKD secure against PNS attacks, when the alternative sifting process of the new four-state protocol is applied. Moreover it suggests a connection between discrete and continuous variables QKD schemes in the limit of a large number of bases, n b →ϱ, that deserves further investigation.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Nicolas Cerf, Daniel Collins, Marcos Curty, Norbert Lütkenhaus, and Grégoire Ribordy for helpful discussion. We acknowledge financial support by the Swiss OFES and NSF within the European project RESQ ͑IST-2001-37559͒ and the national center ''Quantum Photonics.''
APPENDIX A
In this appendix we show that the overlap between all the states in Fig. 3 cannot be decreased by the same quantum operation. Using the parametrization of Eq. ͑26͒, one can see that Now, consider a quantum operation M mapping with some probability p a the states in set a into some new states, ͉0 a Ј͘ and ͉1 a Ј͘, such that ͗0 a Ј͉1 a Ј͘ϭ0. This means that
where iϭ0,1. Because of the linearity of quantum mechanics, the states in set b will be mapped into
with probability
Their overlap is
i.e., the states in set b become less distinguishable.
APPENDIX B
In this appendix we will show that NϪ1 copies of N one-qubit state are always linearly independent ͑see, also Ref. ͓26͔͒. Consider NϪ1 copies of NϪ1 general states of one qubit, ͉ i ͘ with iϭ1,...,NϪ1. They belong to the symmetric subspace (C 2 ) sym (NϪ1) of dimension N. Our aim is to add a new state and see when this state can be written as a linear combination of the previous ones. In other terms, we want to find a state ͉ N ͘C 2 such that the determinant of the NϫN matrix
is zero. Note that the norm of the state does not play any role, so we can write
where x is an unbounded complex number. Condition ͑B1͒ then gives an NϪ1 degree polynomial equation on x. There are NϪ1 solutions, that correspond to the NϪ1 trivial cases
Thus, NϪ1 copies of any N different one-qubit state are always linearly independent.
APPENDIX C
In this appendix we briefly describe the asymmetric phase covariant cloning machines introduced in Refs. ͓30͔ and ͓31͔. These machine clone with maximal fidelity all the states that lie in the a plane of the Bloch sphere, say xy. At first sight, their only difference is that the one in Ref. ͓30͔ uses as an input state a two-qubit reference state plus the state to be cloned, while for the second machine, one qubit suffices as ancillary system.
Consider an input state to be cloned, and a one-qubit ancillary system in a reference state, say ͉0͘. The Niu-Griffiths cloning machine ͓31͔ is defined by the following unitary transformation: 
where
define the standard Bell basis. It is not difficult to see that the local state in the first two qubits is the same as in Eq. ͑C2͒ if one takes Fϭ(1ϩcos ␥)/2. Eve can use these transformations in order to obtain information about the sent bit. She clones the state sent by Alice, and she forwards the first clone to Bob and keeps the second. Obviously there is a compromise between the quality of the two clones: The better Eve's clone the worse Bob's state. Or in other words, the more the information intercepted by Eve, the more the errors on Bob's side, that allow the honest parties to detect Eve's intervention. As seen above, the two machines are in many senses equivalent ͑especially as far as for the cloning fidelities are concerned͒. However the two attacks differ in the amount of correlations Eve establishes with Bob. This fact is going to be very important for the type of protocols analyzed in this work.
APPENDIX D
In this appendix we give two different unitary transformations that somehow generalizes the 1→2 asymmetric cloning machines to the 2→3 case.
The first machine is mainly inspired by Niu-Griffiths construction. The initial input state corresponds to two copies of an unknown one-qubit state, ͉͘ 2 (C 2 C 2 ) sym . Using a two-dimensional ancillary system, say in state ͉0͘, one can define the unitary operation
As in the 1→2 case, this machine has not the same effect on the states ͉0͘ and ͉1͘. After some lengthy algebra one can see that all the states ͉͘ in the xy plane are cloned with the same fidelities, that are equal to ͑see also Fig. 11͒
͑D2͒
Note that when ␥ϭ/4, F 1 NG ϭF 3 NG ϭ(6ϩ2&ϩͱ6)/12 ϳ0.94, slightly larger than the fidelity of the 2→3 universal symmetric cloning machine of Ref. ͓34͔. It has to be stressed that the fidelity for the third clone never reaches the value of one, contrary to what happens for the 1→2 case. As we learned from the analysis of individual attacks, in our protocols it is more convenient to Eve to introduce an extra ancillary system, in such a way that she is better correlated to Bob's result. This can be done introducing an ancillary system on Eve's side, such that the action on the states of the computational basis is symmetrized. Note that in the 1→2 case this procedure allows to pass from the Niu-Griffiths to the Cerf cloning machine. The resulting machine can be expressed as 
͉11͉͘0͘ϭ͉111͘. ͑D4͒
The local state of each of the three first qubits is a combination of the identity with the initial pure state as expected. The cloning fidelities are again equal to Eq. ͑D2͒. The second machine we consider is based on Cerf construction ͓30͔. As an input state we have two qubits of an unknown one-qubit state plus a two-qubit ancillary system. Then, we define the following unitary operation: and v 2 ϩ8x 2 ϭ1. One can see that for any input state in the Bloch sphere, the local state of the first two qubits are two identical clones with fidelity F 1 C ϭF 2 C ϭ1Ϫ2x 2 , while in the third qubit we have another clone with fidelity F 3 C ϭ1Ϫ(vϪ3x) 2 /2. Thus, the machine ͑D5͒ is an asymmetric universal cloning machine, i.e., not phase covariant. Indeed, at the point where the three fidelities are equal, we recover the 2→3 cloning fidelity of Ref. ͓34͔ F 1 C ϭF 3 C ϭ11/12 ͑see also Fig. 11͒ . Note also that in this case, F 3 C can be equal to one. Moreover, there are some points where, for a given fidelity for the first two clones, the fidelity for the third one is larger using this cloning machine than for the phase covariant machine of Eq. ͑D4͒. This shows that the latter is not the optimal phase covariant asymmetric 2→3 cloning machine. One is tempted to generalize Cerf construction in a direct way, defining a phase covariant machine by changing the coefficient of one of the error terms in Ref.
͓D5͔. However, we found that the resulting operation is not unitary. Therefore, we can only propose two possible asymmetric phase covariant machines, although we know that they are not optimal. Nevertheless, it is quite reasonable to suppose that the increase on Eve's information will not be very significant when using the, at present unknown, optimal machine ͓33͔.
͓19͔ P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441 ͑2000͒ and references therein. ͓20͔ We take ␣ϭ0.25 dB/km for all the figures in this paper. ͓21͔ We believe that Eve must necessarily have access to Bob's lab in order to modify his detectors. In contrary to this, one might think that Eve is able to shift the signals she wants to be detected into a wavelength region of higher detector efficiency. But this can be simply avoided by putting a narrow filter before the detector. Or, she can send pulses with large mean photon number whenever she wants the pulse to be detected, but this produces a significant increase of the double counts when Bob chooses the wrong measurement. ͓22͔ In all of the article, we take as the computational basis, ͉0͘ and ͉1͘, the eigenvectors of z with eigenvalues Ϯ1. ͓14͔. It is very plausible that there is no measurement using just linear optics reaching the optimal probability of unambiguous discrimination. ͓29͔ Incidentally note that using the nonperfect but subpoissonian sources of Ref. ͓8͔, this distance can be further increased, since the higher photon-number components are proportionally much smaller than in the poissonian case. ͓30͔ N. J. Cerf, Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4497 ͑2000͒; J. Mod. Opt. 47, 187 ͑2000͒. ͓31͔ C.-S. Niu and R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Rev. A 58, 4377 ͑1998͒. ͓32͔ C. A. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R. B. Griffiths, C.-S. Niu, and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 ͑1997͒. ͓33͔ After completition of this work, the optimal 2→3 phase covariant cloning machine was found in G. M. D'Ariano and C. Macchiavello, quant-ph/0301175. There, the optimal fidelity is shown to be equal to (1ϩͱ7/3)/2ϳ0.9409, slightly larger than the one given in Appendix D of the present paper, (6ϩ2& ϩͱ6)/12ϳ0.9398. ͓34͔ N. Gisin and S. Massar, Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 2153 ͑1997͒. ͓35͔ There may be other generalizations of the initial four-state protocol. For instance, for n b ϭ4, one can consider a bit encoding different from the one in Fig. 8 . The bit bϭ0 can be associated to the states ͉0͘, ͉/4͘, ͉͘, ͉5/4͘, where ͉͘ϭ(͉0͘ ϩe i ͉1͘)/&, and bϭ1 to the other four states. In the sifting process, Alice always announces two states having an overlap of 1/&, as in the initial four-state protocol. In this way, ͑i͒ the discrimination on Bob's side is more robust against imperfect measurement apparatus and ͑ii͒ the probability of accepting a bit is greater, p b ϭ1/(2n b ), and then (n b ) only increases linearly with n b . Since the mean photon number does not need to be very large for having the same key rate generation, the number of multiphoton pulses at a given distance is smaller, and the protocol is more secure against PNS attacks using unambiguous discrimination. However, when one considers storing attacks, the protocol is not efficient. Indeed, Eve can always keep some photons n s without being detected and wait for Alice's announcement. Then, she has to distinguish between n s copies of two states with overlap 1/&. While n s increases with the number of bases, the overlap is independent of n b . Therefore, to increase n b does not provide any advantage to the honest parties when they use this alternative encoding.
